Towards Genetically Optimised Responsive Negotiation Agents by Lau, Raymond et al.
Towards Genetically Optimised Responsive Negotiation Agents
Raymond Y.K. Lau, Maolin Tang, and On Wong
Centre for Information Technology Innovation
Faculty of Information Technology
Queensland University of Technology
GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, Qld 4001, Australia
Email: {r.lau, m.tang, o.wong}@qut.edu.au
Department of Information Systems
City University of Hong Kong
Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon
Hong Kong SAR
Abstract
Real-world negotiations are characterised by combinatori-
ally complex negotiation spaces, tough deadlines, bounded
agent rationality, very limited information about the
opponents, and volatile negotiator preferences. Classical
negotiation models fail to address most of these issues. This
paper illustrates our practical negotiation agents which are
empowered by an effective and efficient genetic algorithm
to deal with complex, incomplete, and dynamic negotiation
spaces arising in real-world applications. Initial experi-
ment demonstrates that our genetically optimised adaptive
negotiation agents outperform a theoretically optimal
negotiation model when time pressure exists. Our research
work opens the door to the development of responsive and
adaptive negotiation agents for real-world applications.
Keywords: Genetic Algorithm, Automated Negotiation,
Adaptive Agents.
1 Introduction
Negotiation has long been an active research topic in the
field of Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) [22], Multi-
Agent Systems (MAS) [14], Game Theory [23], and more
recently in agent-mediated e-Commerce [10, 11]. Negoti-
ation refers to the process by which group of agents (hu-
man or software) communicate with one another in order to
reach a mutually acceptable agreement on resource alloca-
tion (distribution) [9, 12]. Software agents are encapsulated
computer systems situated in some environments such as
the Internet and are capable of flexible, autonomous actions
in that environment to meet their design objectives [24]. In
the context of automated negotiation, software agents can
autonomously and proactively conduct bargaining on be-
half of their human users [3, 12].
1.1 The Problems
Many real-world negotiation problems are characterised
by combinatorially complex negotiation spaces which in-
volve many issues. Under such circumstance, even expe-
rienced human negotiators will often be overwhelmed by
the explosive number of alternatives. Consequently, sub-
optimal rather than optimal deals are made. Moreover, com-
plete information about a negotiation space (e.g., the op-
ponent’s preferences) is generally not available to an agent
to deliberate negotiation solutions. In realistic negotiation
situations, negotiator’s preferences may also change over
time because of changing objectives or tasks at hand. These
problems are compounded by the challenge that negotia-
tors (human or software) are often bounded by limited com-
putational resources and negotiation time [9, 12]. One of
the ways to tackle these problems is to augment negotia-
tion agents with learning and adaptation mechanisms so that
these agents can learn from their opponents based on their
previous encounters and continuously adapt to the changing
negotiation contexts [15, 25].
1.2 Related Work
Various learning and adaptation approaches such as
Bayesian learning [25], Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) [26],
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and Genetic Algorithms (GA) [1, 20] have been explored
to provide negotiation systems with learning and adaptation
capabilities. However, these approaches are still primitive
in terms of what can be learned (e.g., single issue only) and
their sensitivity to the changing negotiation contexts.
It has been argued that the challenge of research in ne-
gotiation is to develop models that can track the shifting
tactics of negotiators [15]. Accordingly, genetic algorithms
based negotiation agents were developed to model the dy-
namic concession matching behaviour arising in bi-lateral
negotiation situations [4, 15]. The set of feasible offers of a
negotiation agent is represented by a population of chro-
mosomes. Based on the standard genetic operators such
as selection, crossover, and mutation, the population of
chromosomes evolves over time and the fittest chromosome
from the current generation is chosen as a tentative solution
(i.e., a counter-offer). Rubenstein-Montano and Malaga
have also reported a GA-based negotiation mechanism for
searching optimal solutions for multiparty multi-objective
negotiations under the assumption that preferences (i.e., the
utility functions) of all the negotiation parties are available
to a central negotiation mechanism [20]. Instead of using
the evolutionary approach to develop an agent’s concession
generation mechanism, a GA has been used to learn opti-
mal negotiation tactics given a particular negotiation situa-
tion (e.g., a predefined amount of negotiation time) [17]. A
GA is also used to study the bargaining behaviour of bound-
edly rational agents in a single issue (e.g., price) bi-lateral
negotiation situation [8]. It is found that the stable outcome
generated by the GA model matches the equilibrium out-
come identified by the corresponding game-theoretic model
under certain conditions [8].
1.3 Contributions
The main contribution of the work reported in this paper
is the development of responsive (e.g., agents can take into
account time pressure) and adaptive (e.g., agents can learn
the opponent’s changing preferences based on their moves
in a negotiation session) negotiation agents to solve real-
world negotiation problems. The issues such as time pres-
sure, incomplete information, and bounded agent rational-
ity arising in multi-party multi-issue negotiations have not
been addressed properly by previous research work. Our
current work proposes a GA-based agent model to alleviate
these problems. The performance of our GA-based adaptive
negotiation agents has been evaluated empirically and com-
pared with that of a logic-based adaptive agent model [16].
2 A Basic Negotiation Model
The basic negotiation model illustrated in this section
is based on multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) [13] and
is first discussed in [2]. This simple model can guarantee
Pareto optimal if an agreement zone exists in a negotiation
space. Therefore, we use it as a baseline model to evaluate
the performance of our GA-based negotiation agents.
2.1 Representing offers
An offer −→o =< da1, da2, . . . , dan > is a tuple of at-
tribute values (intervals) pertaining to a finite set of at-
tributes A = {a1, a2, . . . , an}. An offer can also be viewed
as a vector of attribute values in a geometric negotiation
space with each dimension representing a negotiation is-
sue. Each attribute ai takes its value from the correspond-
ing domain Dai . Generally speaking, a finite set of candi-
date offers Op acceptable to an agent p (i.e., satisfying its
hard constraints) is constructed via the Cartesian product
Da1 ×Da2 × · · · ×Dan. As human agents tend to specify
their preferences in terms of a range of values, a more gen-
eral representation of an offer is a tuple of attribute value
intervals such as oi =< 20 − 30(K), 1 − 2(years), 10 −
30(days), 100− 500(units) >.
2.2 Representing negotiation preferences
The valuations of individual attributes and attribute val-
ues (intervals) are defined by the valuation functions UAp :
A → [0, 1] and UDap : Da → [0, 1] respectively, whereas
UAp is an agent p’s valuation function for each attribute
a ∈ A, and UDap is an agent p’s valuation function for each
attribute value da ∈ Da. In addition, the valuations of at-
tributes are assumed normalised, that is,
∑
a∈A U
A
p (a) = 1.
One common way to quantify an agent’s preference (i.e.,
the utility function Uop ) for an offer o is by a linear aggre-
gation of the valuations [2, 21]: Uop (o) =
∑
a∈A U
A
p (a) ×
UDap (da). For example, if an agent p’s valuations for the
attributes are: UAp (price) = 0.9 and UAp (quantity) = 0.1,
and its valuations for the attribute intervals are: UDap (20 −
30$) = 0.8 and UDap (100− 200units) = 0.5, then an offer
oi =< 20−30($), 100−200(units) > has utility 0.77 (i.e.,
Uop (oi) = 0.9× 0.8 + 0.1× 0.5 = 0.77) from the agent p’s
perspective.
2.3 Computing concessions and generating offers
If an agent’s initial proposal is rejected by its opponent,
it needs to propose an alternative offer with the least utility
decrement (i.e., computing a concession). An agent will
maintain a set O′p which contains the offers it has proposed
before or the offer to be proposed in the current round. In
a negotiation round, an alternative offer with a concession
can be determined based on:
∃ocounter∈{Op−O′p}∀ox∈{Op−O′p} : [ox p ocounter]
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ox p oy denotes that an offer oy is more preferable than
another offer ox. The above statement defines that the al-
ternative offer ocounter is the most preferable offer from
among the set of feasible offers which have not been pro-
posed before. The preference relation p is a total ordering
induced by an agent p’s utility function Uop over the set of
feasible offers Op. In other words, the feasible offers of an
agent p are ranked in descending order of utility driven by
(p, Op). An alternative offer with concession is picked up
from the top of the list ranked by (p, {Op − O′p}) in a
negotiation round.
2.4 Evaluating incoming offers
When an incoming offer o is received from an opponent,
an agent p first evaluates if o ∈ Op is true (i.e., the offer
satisfying all its hard constraints). To do this, an equivalent
offer o should be computed. o represents agent p’s in-
terpretation about the opponent’s proposal o. Once o for o
is computed, acceptance of the incoming offer o can be de-
termined with respect to p’s own preference (p, Op). An
offer o ∈ Op is equivalent to o iff every attribute interval
of o intersects each corresponding attribute interval of o.
Formally, any two attribute intervals dx, dy intersect if the
intersection of the corresponding sets of points is not empty
(i.e., dx ∩ dy = ∅). The acceptance criteria for an incoming
offer o (i.e., the equivalent o) is defined by:
1. If ∀ox∈Op ox p o, an agent p should accept o since
it produces the maximal payoff.
2. If o ∈ O′p is true, an agent p should accept o because
o is one of its previous proposals or is the one to be
proposed in the current round.
It has been proved that if each participating agent p ∈ P
employs their preference ordering (p, Op) to compute
concessions and uses the offer acceptability criteria de-
scribed above to evaluate incoming offers, Pareto optimal
is always found if it exists in a negotiation space [2]. A
solution is Pareto optimal if it is impossible to find another
solution such that at least one agent will be better off but no
agent will be worse off [19]. However, Pareto optimal does
not necessarily lead to maximal joint payoff. Joint payoff
simply refers to the sum of each agent’s payoff obtained at
the end of a negotiation.
3 Genetically Optimised Negotiation Agents
Development of our GA-based adaptive negotiation
agents is driven by the basic intuition that negotiators tend
to maximise their individual payoffs while ensuring that an
agreement is reached [7, 15]. In each negotiation agent, a
population of chromosomes is used to represent a subset of
feasible offers. Since an agent knows its own utility func-
tion, an offer omax representing the offer with the maximal
payoff can be identified. In addition, an offer oopponent rep-
resents the opponent’s most recent counter-offer. According
to the basic intuition, a feasible offer is considered fit if it is
close to omax and oopponent. The distance from a feasible
offer to omax and oopponent can be measured based on stan-
dard distance function such as the Mahalanobis distance [5].
In each negotiation round, the offer vectors oopponent and
omax may change, and so are the offers considered fit by
the agent. In other words, an agent is learning and adapting
the opponent’s preferences gradually.
3.1 Offer encoding
Each GA-based negotiation agent p utilises a popula-
tion of chromosomes to represent a subset of feasible offers
Ofeasp ⊆ Op. Each chromosome consists of a fixed num-
ber of fields. The first field uniquely identifies a chromo-
some, and the second field is used to hold the fitness value
of the chromosome. The other fields (genes) represent the
attribute values of a candidate offer. Figure 1 depicts the
decimal encoding (Genotype) of some chromosomes and a
two-point crossover operation. The genetic operators such
as crossover and mutation are only applied to the genes rep-
resenting the attribute values of an offer.
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Figure 1. Encoding Candidate Offers
3.2 The fitness function
The top t chromosomes (candidate offers) with the high-
est fitness are selected from a population to build the solu-
tion set S. If the size of S is 1, it means that the fittest chro-
mosome from a population is chosen as an offer. In general,
a stochastic selection function is applied to the solution set
to choose a member as the solution (i.e., the current offer)
in a particular negotiation round. Ideally, a fitness function
should reflect the joint payoff of each candidate offer. Un-
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fortunately, the utility functions of the opponents are nor-
mally not available for real-world applications. Therefore,
the proposed fitness function approximates the ideal func-
tion and captures three important issues: an agent’s own
payoff, the opponent’s partial preference (e.g., the most re-
cent counter offer), and time pressure:
fitness(o) = α× TP (t)× U
o
p (o)
Uop (omax)
+
(1− α× TP (t))× (1− dist(−→o ,−→o opponent)MaxDist(|A|) )
(1)
where omax represents an offer which produces the maxi-
mal payoff based on an agent p’s current utility function;
−→o opponent is the offer vector representing the most recent
counter-offer proposed by an opponent. The parameter
α ∈ [0, 1] is the trade-off factor to control the relative im-
portance of optimising one’s own payoff or reaching a deal
(e.g., by considering the opponent’s recent offer). In other
words, α is used to model a wide spectrum of agent atti-
tudes, from fully self-interested (α = 1) to fully benevolent
(α = 0). The term MaxDist(|A|) represents the maxi-
mal distance of a geometric negotiation space. It can be
derived from the number of dimensions |A| if each dimen-
sion (attribute) is normalised in the unit interval. In the very
first negotiation round, an agent may use MaxDist(|A|)
to replace the actual distance dist(−→o ,−→o opponent) in Eq.(1)
since oopponent may be unknown at this stage.
The distance between two offer vectors dist(−→o x,−→o y)
is defined by the Mahalanobis distance [5] with the general
form:
distMahalanobis(−→o x,−→o y) = (−→o x −−→o y)TR(−→o x −−→o y)
(2)
where R is a positive definite matrix defining the Maha-
lanobis space (a pooled sample covariance matrix). For
our application, R is a positive diagonal matrix with each
non-zero element wi ∈ (0, 1] lining up on the diagonal of
R. It turns out that such Mahalanobis distances become the
weighted Euclidean distances:
dist(−→o x,−→o y) =
√√√√ |A|∑
i=1
wi(dxi − dyi )2 (3)
where the weight factor wi = UAp (ai) is an agent’s val-
uation for a particular attribute ai ∈ A. An offer vector−→o x contains an attribute value dxi along the ith dimension
(issue) in a negotiation space. If an attribute interval in-
stead of a single value is specified for an offer, the mid-
point of an attribute interval is first computed. The mid-
point value is then scaled to the unit interval [0, 1] by lin-
ear scaling: dscaledi =
di−dmini
dmaxi −dmini
, where the scaled at-
tribute value dscaledi will take on values from the unit in-
terval [0, 1]. dmini and dmaxi represent the minimal and the
maximal values for a domain Dai .
For practical negotiations arising in business contexts,
time pressure is often an important factor for concession
generation. When the negotiation deadline is close, an agent
is more likely to concede in order to make a deal. However,
different agents may have different attitudes towards dead-
lines. An agent may be eager to reach a deal and so it will
concede quickly (Conceder agent). On the other hand, an
agent may not give ground easily during negotiation (Boul-
ware agent) [18]. Therefore, a time pressure function TP
is developed to approximate a wide spectrum of agent atti-
tudes towards time. Our TP function is similar to the nego-
tiation decision function referred to in the literature [6, 9].
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Figure 2. Agent Attitudes Towards Deadline
TP (t) = 1− (min(t, t
d
p)
tdp
)
1
ep (4)
TP (t) denotes the time pressure given the time t repre-
sented by the absolute time or the number of negotiation
rounds; tdp indicates the deadline for an agent p and it is
either expressed as absolute time or the maximum number
of rounds allowed. The term ep denotes the agent p’s ea-
gerness factor for negotiation. An agent p is Boulware if
0 < ep < 1 is set; for a conceder agent, ep > 1 is true.
If ep = 1 is established, the agent holds Linear attitude
towards the deadline. The values of the TP function are
within the unit interval [0, 1]. The eagerness factor ep can
be chosen by the user or else a system default is assumed
before a negotiation process begins. Figure 2 shows the ex-
amples of 7 agent attitudes towards deadline (with eager-
ness factor ep = 50, 10, 5, 1, 0.1, 0.5, 0.02). For instance,
for a Boulware agent with ep = 0.02, its original prefer-
ence maintains the same (e.g., discount factor = 1) until the
negotiation deadline is approaching (e.g., fraction of time
> 0.9).
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3.3 The Genetic Algorithm
An agent’s adaptive negotiation strategy is developed
based on the following genetic algorithm:
CREATE the first population P 0 which consists of omax
and N − 1 individuals randomly selected from the set
Op = Da1 ×Da2 × · · · ×Dan;
WHILE NOT (Exit Criteria)
P i+1 = Best(P i);
MP = Selection(P i);
DO UNTIL Size(P i+1) = N
I1 = Crossover(MP );
I2 = Mutation(MP );
I3 = Cloning(MP );
P i+1 = P i+1 ∪ I1 ∪ I2 ∪ I3;
END UNTIL
END WHILE
The initial population P 0 is created by incorporating the
member omax that maximises an agent p’s payoff in the first
round, and by randomly selecting the N − 1 members from
the candidate set Op, where N is the pre-defined population
size. At the beginning of each evolution cycle, the fitness
value of each chromosome is computed based on the most
current negotiation parameters (e.g., an agent’s utility func-
tion and the opponent’s counter-offer). Elitism is incorpo-
rated by executing the Best function to copy the e% fittest
chromosomes from the current generation P i to the new
generation P i+1. By executing the Selection function, ei-
ther Tournament selection [17] or Roulette-wheel selection
can be used to create a mating pool MP .
For tournament selection, a group of k members are se-
lected from a population to form a tournament. The mem-
ber with the highest fitness among the selected k members
is placed in the mating pool. This procedure is repeated n
times until the mating pool is full. Standard genetic opera-
tors: cloning, crossover, mutation are applied to the mating
pool to create new members according to pre-defined proba-
bilities. These operations continue until the new generation
of size N is created. Cloning simply means creating a mem-
ber in the new generation by exactly copying from a chro-
mosome in the previous generation. Two-point crossover
is used to exchange the fields (offer attribute values) be-
tween two parents to create two new members. In each
two-point crossover operation, two points are randomly se-
lected and the fields within the boundary defined by the two
points are exchanged. An example of a basic crossover op-
eration is depicted in Figure 1. In addition, more sophisti-
cated crossover operation involves searching for new genes
based on the parents’ fitness. For the enhanced crossover,
two points are still randomly selected. However, instead
of simply swapping the genes between two parents, these
genes (i.e., attribute values) are computed according to:
dai =
f1
f1 + f2
× d1ai +
f2
f1 + f2
× d2ai (5)
where d1ai and d
2
ai are the genes from the first and the sec-
ond parents, and f1 and f2 are the fitness values of the cor-
responding parents.
Mutation involves randomly replacing some attribute
values encoded on a chromosome by other attribute values
from the permissible attribute domains of an agent. There-
fore, the proposed mutation operation will not generate of-
fer values which are not acceptable to an agent. In addition,
adaptive mutation rate is used in our genetic algorithm. The
mutation rate is inversely proportional to the average fitness
of a population: Rateadaptive = 1Fitnessavg . A baseline
mutation rate is defined by the user of a negotiation agent.
Then, the effective mutation rate is derived from the product
of the adaptive rate and the baseline mutation rate in each
evolution cycle. An evolution cycle is invoked after every
x negotiation round(s), where x is the evolution frequency
defined by the user. There is another parameter (number
of evolutions) to define the number of evolutions to be per-
formed in an evolution cycle. This parameter corresponds
to the exit criteria defined in our GA.
After an offer with concession is computed, the agent’s
decision for an incoming offer can also be developed. If the
incoming counter-offer produces a payoff greater than or
equal to that of the current proposal, a rational agent should
accept the incoming offer; otherwise the incoming counter-
offer should be rejected.
4 The Experiments
The negotiation spaces of our experiment were char-
acterized by bilateral negotiations between a buyer agent
pB and a seller agent pS . Each negotiation profile con-
sists of 4 attributes with each attribute domain contain-
ing 4 discrete values represented by the natural numbers
Da = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The valuation of an attribute or a dis-
crete attribute value was in the interval of (0, 1]. For each
negotiation case, an agreement zone always exists since the
difference between a buyer and a seller only lies on their
valuations against the same set of negotiation issues (e.g.,
attributes and attribute values). For each agent p, the size
of the feasible offer set is Op = 44 = 256. 5 negotia-
tion groups with each group containing 10 cases were con-
structed. For each negotiation case in a group, the nego-
tiation profile (e.g., the preferences) of a buyer was ran-
domly created according to the configuration mentioned be-
fore (i.e., 4 attributes with each attribute containing a value
di ∈ Da). A buyer’s profile was then copied to create a
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seller’s profile. The seller’s profile was modified with vari-
ous levels of preferential difference introduced (i.e., modi-
fying the valuations of some attributes and attribute values).
For the first simulation group, each negotiation case
contained identical buyer/seller preferences (i.e., the same
weights for the attributes and the same valuations against
the same set of attribute values). This group was used as
a control group and the other groups were the experimen-
tal groups. Each negotiation case in the second group con-
tained 20% preferential difference between a buyer and a
seller (e.g., one valuation of an attribute value is different).
Each case in the succeeding group was injected a 20% in-
crement of preferential difference. The genetic parameters
were: population size = 30, mating pool size = 20, size of
solution set = 1, elitism factor = 10%, tournament size =
2, cloning rate = 0.2, crossover rate = 0.6, baseline mu-
tation rate = 0.01, Number of evolutions per cycle = 5,
and evolution frequency = 1 (i.e., one evolution cycle per
negotiation round). Tournament selection, basic two-point
crossover, and adaptive mutation rate were used for the ex-
periment reported in this paper. The negotiation trade-off
factor α = 0.5 and the negotiation deadline = 50 (rounds)
were set for each negotiation session. The agents’ perfor-
mance was measured in terms of joint-payoff (i.e., the sum
of each individual’s utility). If an agreement could not be
made after the deadline was reached, zero utility was as-
sumed for each agent.
Group Preferential Joint-Util. Joint-Util. ∆utility
Difference (Basic) (GA)
1 0% 1.37 1.37 0.0%
2 20% 1.42 1.39 −2.1%
3 40% 1.28 1.36 6.3%
4 60% 0.98 1.29 31.6%
5 80% 0.84 1.33 58.3%
Overall 1.18 1.35 18.8%
Table 1. Comparative negotiation perfor-
mance GA vs. Basic
Group Preferential Joint-Util. Joint-Util. ∆utility
Difference (Logic) (GA)
1 0% 1.37 1.37 0.0%
2 20% 1.36 1.39 2.2%
3 40% 1.41 1.36 −3.5%
4 60% 1.32 1.29 −2.3%
5 80% 1.25 1.33 6.4%
Overall 1.34 1.35 0.6%
Table 2. Comparative negotiation perfor-
mance GA vs. Logic
The purpose of the first experiment was to study the
general performance of the GA-based adaptive negotiation
agents when compared with the baseline negotiation model
(Section 2) which guarantees Pareto optimal. Both the
buyer agent and the seller agent were Boulware agents with
eagerness factor ep = 0.5. All the simulation runs (each
case in the 5 negotiation groups) were performed on our ne-
gotiation server with the configuration of a single Pentium
III 800 MHz CPU and 512MB main memory. Both the GA-
based negotiation agents and the negotiation agents in our
baseline system dealt with exactly the same set of negotia-
tion cases.
Table 1 summarizes the average joint-payoff for each ne-
gotiation group. A positive ∆utility indicates that the GA-
based negotiation agents are more effective than the base-
line negotiation system. An overall results of ∆utility =
18.8% was obtained. Since the proposed GA-based ne-
gotiation agents can observe their opponents’ preferences
and continuously learn this information via the opponents’
counter-offers, the search for a mutually acceptable offer
becomes faster. Moreover, as the GA-based negotiation
agents were responsive to time pressure, most of the agree-
ments could be reached on or before the deadline. On the
other hand, the basic negotiation system which can guaran-
tee Pareto optimal failed to develop some negotiation solu-
tions with the present of time pressure.
For the control negotiation group (group 1), both systems
could successfully identify all the negotiation given exactly
the same preferences of the negotiators. In fact, both sys-
tems could identify the solution in the first round for each
case in the first negotiation group. In general, the perfor-
mance gap between these two negotiation systems becomes
larger if the preferential differences between the buyer and
the seller are bigger. The reason is that the GA-based nego-
tiation agents are equipped with effective learning mecha-
nisms to learn and adapt to the opponents’ preferences even
though the preferential differences between the parties are
big. Our second experiment compared the performance of
our GA-based adaptive negotiation agents with that of the
belief revision logic based adaptive negotiation agents [16]
under the same experimental setting as the first experiment.
For the logic-based negotiation agents, persuasive negotia-
tion was activated such that each agent would disclose its
preference (i.e., the entrenchment degree) for one attribute
value in each counter-offer. The results were shown in Ta-
ble 2. It is shown that the GA-based and the logic-based
adaptive negotiation agents have comparable performance
in our simulation runs.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Real-world negotiation problems are characterised by
combinatorially complex negotiation spaces, tough negoti-
ation deadlines, limited information about the opponents,
and volatile negotiator preferences. Therefore, practical
negotiation agents must be equipped with effective learn-
ing mechanisms to automatically acquire domain knowl-
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edge from the negotiation environments and continuously
adapt to the changing negotiation contexts. Our proposed
GA-based adaptive negotiation agents are empowered by
an effective genetic algorithm which takes into account an
agent’s self-payoff, the opponent’s preferences, and the time
pressure. Therefore, these GA-based adaptive negotiation
agents can identify near optimal solutions based on limited
information about the negotiation spaces. Our initial exper-
iments show that under time pressure, the GA-based adap-
tive negotiation agents outperform the theoretically optimal
negotiation agents which guarantee Pareto optimal. In ad-
dition, the performance of our GA-based agents is compa-
rable to the logic-based adaptive negotiation agents. Future
work includes the evaluation of our agents based on real
negotiation cases and the improvement of the genetic algo-
rithm by taking into account the market-oriented factors in
multi-lateral negotiations.
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